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THESIS SUMMARY

This paper provides a descriptive analysis of an original data set I have been collecting since May
2015. The data set evaluates 137 state constitutions and their subsequent amendments (from 17762015) for 42 different factors identified by various political scientists as relevant to judicial
independence. The concept of judicial independence, boiled down to the simplest of terms, is how
isolated the judiciary is from the “political” branches of government (the executive and the
legislature). The measured variables include, but are not limited to, selection method, retention
method, term length, ability of court to set their own procedures, whether the salary for state
supreme court justices are set by the constitution, if the courts are explicitly granted judicial review
power, and the presence of intermediate appellate courts.
The collection of this data set was motivated by an apparent lack of its existence elsewhere.
Court scholars that analyze US state courts have tended to focus their studies on the effect of
various appointment methods (non-partisan elections, partisan elections, appointment by
independent body, etc.) on the observed level of judicial independence. International court scholars
have instead turned to a wide variety of other factors (including many of those mentioned
previously) as explanations for judicial independence, or the lack of it. This data set, and the
resulting paper, seeks to bridge the gap between both sets of literature to provide for more
comprehensive and explanatory analysis on US state courts.
For the purposes of this paper, I have focused on trends formed by observed changes in the
data. This is because any factors that remain stagnant through the years can be dismissed, as they
are clearly not the variables that produce variations in the level of judicial independence in high
state courts. The observed trends noted in this paper often align closely with global trends in
judicial independence noted by international court scholars.
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In this paper, I also discuss the problems that would be introduced by developing a
numerical index to measure judicial independence using this data. This is something I initially
wanted to do in order to get a more easily understood measure of judicial independence, but the
resulting problems would be too great to proceed. However, the data set has plenty of explanatory
power without as is without using that method.
I end the paper by examining potential future applications for this data set. The data can be
applied to answer a wide variety of questions related to judicial independence and US state
supreme courts. It will certainly prove interesting for years to come.
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ABSTRACT

In this paper I present original data collected for over three dozen factors capturing constitutional
provisions for judicial independence for all 50 US states, from statehood to 2015. Drawing on
insights from research on comparative courts, this data set goes far beyond simple appointment
procedures, and includes tenure, rule-making ability, removal procedures, and other factors
affecting the relationship between the judiciary and political branches. I further discuss how this
data can be used in the future to address debates over the effect of institutional design on judicial
behavior, as well as how changes in political conditions affect the role of courts.
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INTRODUCTION

To what extent do state constitutions make strides toward increased judicial independence over
time? Scholars of state courts have consistently recognized that appointment procedures embedded
in state constitutions affect judicial independence of state high courts, but other de jure provisions
that profoundly affect overall judicial independence and behavior of judges receive little attention.
Research on comparative judicial politics, on the other hand, focuses on constitutional provisions
for a variety of factors, including salary protections, judicial review, the ability of a court to set its
own procedures, and judge tenure length (Keith, 2002; Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Melton and
Ginsburg, 2014). In this paper I integrate insights from comparative research into the study of state
courts in order to describe the entire set of institutional factors affecting the power of state courts.
The principle of judicial independence refers to the isolation of the courts from the political
branches of government: the legislature and executive. More specifically, it is the courts’ ability
to implement their interpretations of the law through judicial decisions independent of political
pressures they may otherwise be exposed to by the other branches and the people (Boies, 2006).
Judicial independence is sought after as it helps to ensure that the rule of law will be preserved
over time despite the actions of political actors and the impact of political pressures (Boies, 2006).
De jure (Latin, “in law”) refers to the codified constitutional guidelines – the text of the law at face
value. De jure constitutional provisions are not the only component that matters, as the effects of
the implementation, or lack of implementation, of de jure provisions also plays into the level of
judicial independence of a court (Feld and Voigt, 2003; Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Melton and
Ginsburg, 2014; Ramseyer, 1994). This is de facto (Latin: “in fact”) judicial independence. The
focus of this paper is de jure independence, so it will ignore the significant and growing literature
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on de facto independence.1
Given the wide-range of institutional differences across state courts, one should expect to
observe differences across the behavior of state judges. However, scholars have not systematically
examined these institutional differences and their relation to judicial independence at the state
court level. Doing so requires an analysis of each state constitution to identify the institutional
design of the judiciary. My paper takes steps toward addressing this gap in the literature by
focusing on over three dozen factors capturing constitutional provisions related to judicial
independence for all fifty states, from their original incorporation to 2015. I provide descriptive
statistics and evaluate trends in constitutional provisions affecting judicial independence within
the data over time. I then discuss how this data can be used to examine fundamental questions of
judicial behavior among state judges.
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION

The current focus of much state court research is the effect of different types of appointment
procedures, primarily elections, on judicial independence and behavior. However, this emphasis
differs greatly from comparative court research on judicial independence, attributable in large part
to the fact that electing judges is a practice unique to US states (and, recently, Bolivia), so its
relevance to the rest of the world is minimal. A large gap exists in research on state courts as
scholars have failed to examine other factors appearing in constitutional provisions that affect
judicial independence, despite clear insights drawn from comparative court research that factors
other than appointment method have a strong effect on judicial independence.

1

This literature has proved to be contentious over the question of whether de jure judicial independence actually
matters. See also Rios-Figueroa and Stanton, 2012.
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The data collected for this research can be used in a wide variety of applications to answer
questions about de jure provisions for judicial independence in state constitutions. However, in
order to begin analysis on the questions that drive this research, the data must first be understood
and analyzed at a basic level. This paper is the first step towards a greater understanding of
applications of the data collected, and it will prove useful in later applications of the data as it is
truly the building blocks of further analysis. Since the 1985 United Nations adoption of standards
for creating and maintaining judicial independence (Keith, 2002), constitutions throughout the
world have undergone an increase in explicit provisions designed to afford the judiciary with more
independence, and as these de jure provisions for judicial independence become more common,
de facto judicial independence is increasing as well (Melton and Ginsburg, 2014). With that change
over time in mind, in this paper I discuss the formal powers of the judiciary in US states across
149 state constitutions and subsequent amendments. It is well known that formal rules of the
judiciary are important but until now, the factor has not been evaluated at the state court level.
The authority of state courts can best be measured through the evaluation of state
constitutions. State courts are laid out in detail across individual state constitutions, remaining
unmentioned in the federal constitution. Statutes often build on state constitutional text in order to
further clarify and expand constitutional provisions, but they provide severely inadequate
evaluations of institutional design, lacking the over-arching blueprint of state government
constitutions convey. Additionally, coding data for statutes is difficult. It is not only challenging
to find the original text of state statutes, but statutes are often too great in number to comb through
and analyze effectively.
Previously, I chose to exclude amendments passed to each constitution in analysis, instead
looking at the text of the constitution itself at the time of passage. When the constitution is changed,
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it is the time that a group of people, in many cases a majority of voters as well as a supermajority
of the state legislature, decide that the existing structure of government within the state is failing
and move to make a sweeping fundamental change. Additionally, amendments to both federal and
state constitutions rarely have any effect on the judiciary.
In contrast, I have opted to use the full data set — all state constitutions passed between
1776–2015 and subsequent amendments relevant to the factors collected here — for analysis in
this paper. However, after expanding the analysis, I maintain that new constitutions are more
important to focus on than amendments, as previously stated. Amendments fail to bring about
significant, wholesale institutional change in the way that new constitutions do. I will further detail
this argument in the results section.
To get a better sense of what constitutional provisions affecting courts looked like at
various points in history, I split the data into three distinct time periods: pre-Civil War,
Reconstruction, and Present Day. These divisions were created to more easily analyze the data and
were done so according to observed trends in similarities to changes made in constitutional
provisions during these periods. The pre-Civil War period encompasses all constitutions and
amendments from United States independence up to the beginning of the Civil War (1776-1860).
The Reconstruction period spans 1863-1913, including constitutional provisions passed during
Reconstruction and much of the Progressive Era until the start of World War I. This period also
spans the union entry dates for all 48 contiguous US states (and thus, the initial constitutions passed
for these states), with Arizona being the last of these to join on February 14, 1912. The final time
period, Present Day, includes all constitutional provisions created and changed from 1914-2015,
which includes several clusters of rapid constitutional change following World War I, World War
II, and in the latter portion of the 20th century.
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In this paper, I will first provide a holistic look of the construction of constitutional
provisions in each period. Then I will discuss the nature of change in constitutional arrangements
during these time periods. I focused my attention on the changes that occurred affecting courts
within all 149 constitutions and subsequent amendments because changes within factors prove to
be much more telling and interesting than those remaining stagnant. This is because unchanging
factors can be dismissed as relevant factors in explaining variations and levels of judicial
independence in US states.
DATA

In recent years, great strides have been taken towards understanding the protections of
constitutional provisions on global courts, but the literature on state courts does not incorporate
the insights of research performed on a global scale. Many published works have elements or
portions of this data in their evaluations of judicial independence, but most research on state courts
has been focused on one institutional feature: whether or not judges are elected. Thus, it was
important that this informational void be filled in order to further understand judicial independence
and the relationship between the judiciary and the political branches of government. Over the
summer of 2015, I conducted data collection to compile this previously uncollected data set. It
goes far beyond the examination of appointment procedures across all 50 states, encompassing
over three-dozen factors capturing de jure constitutional provisions for judicial independence. The
measured factors here do include the appointment procedures for state supreme court justices, but
also evaluate retention methods, judicial tenure, removal procedures, public recalls, protection
from salary reduction, financial independence, formalized judicial review procedures, ability of
other actors to overturn judicial decisions, ballot initiatives, referenda, and others.

10

This research provides insight into de jure provisions for judicial independence in all state
constitutions and amendments from statehood to 2015. The coded data for this portion of research
was first based upon the original text of the constitution at the time of ratification, and then each
change made to the constitution through subsequent amendments was also recorded. I began the
data collection process by gathering information from the most recently adopted versions of each
states’ constitution, which had adoption dates ranging from 1790 (Massachusetts) to 1983
(Georgia). I turned to a variety of online sources, namely state legislature websites and WestLaw
Next to do this. After, I compiled and evaluated the relevant constitutional amendments to the
current documents, adopted through August 2015. Then, I began the task of collecting data from
the previous constitutions of each state. Some states have only had the one (current) constitution,
while Louisiana has been governed under eleven official constitutions. Throughout this process, I
ensured I was using the original text of each constitution. I then proceeded to collect the
amendments relevant to the judiciary for each outdated constitution. I excluded any constitutions
or codified laws pre-dating statehood.
During the data collection process, each constitution and its subsequent amendments were
evaluated for 42 different variables designed to evaluate judicial independence, based on factors
identified as important in comparative court literature.2 The factors have been grouped as shown
below (Table 1):
Table 1. Summary of Groupings
Group 1:
Court anchored in the constitution
Statement that court is independent
Group 2:
Procedures for constitutional amendments
Group 3:
Appointment procedures for high-court judges
Group 4:
Retention procedures for high-court judges
2

There are some factors excluded in this paper due to either lack of variation or the desire for simplicity. The
factor for which data was collected for but are excluded here are: ban on military courts, presence of an
intermediate appellate court, and number of removal actors.
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Group 5:
Group 6:
Group 7:
Group 8:
Group 9:
Group 10:

Judicial tenure
Removal procedures for high-court judges
Judicial salaries and finances
Miscellaneous group – includes judicial review
powers and decision publication
Power to set court procedures
Ballot initiatives and referenda

The first variable is whether or not the court is anchored in the constitution (Table 2). For
this to be coded as “yes,” the constitution must state explicitly that there is a state court. In the
majority of constitutions studied, the court was anchored. The next variable measured whether or
not the constitution states the judiciary is independent. Many times, this was not explicitly stated,
instead coming in the form of a simple statement that the three branches of government within the
state retain individual powers that cannot be encroached upon by the other branches.
Group 1
Is the court anchored in the constitution (Feld and
Voigt, 2003)?
Does the constitution state the judiciary is
independent (Keith, 2002)?

Yes
No
Yes
No

The next grouping of variables (Table 3) evaluates the procedures for amending the
constitution in each state. The first of these asks whether the procedures for amendment are
explicitly stated within the text of the constitution. The second and third, respectively, ask if the
legislature has the power to initiate constitutional change or if other actors can initiate the change.
If the legislature alone holds the power to begin the process of changing the constitution, it is coded
as “exclusive power,” but if other actors can as well, they are specified in the third variable and
the legislature’s ability to initiate is coded as “yes.” The next two variables ask if the legislature
holds any power to change the constitution, regardless of whether or not they can initiate the
changes. This was to be coded as one of five levels: no power, yes, shared with constitutional
convention, shared with public, or exclusive power.
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Group 2: Amendments
Are the procedures for amending the constitution
explicitly stated (Feld and Voigt, 2003)?
Can the legislature initiate constitutional change?

Can other actors initiate constitutional change?

Does the legislature have any power to change
the constitution?

Yes
No
Exclusive Power
Yes
No Power
Not Specified
Executive
The People
No
Not Specified
Yes
Shared with Public
Shared with Public & Con. Conv.
Shared with Con. Conv.
No
Not Specified

In order to evaluate the ability of other actors to alter the document, the next few variables
record the legislative majority required to change the constitution, if there is a requirement of a
future legislature to consent to the change and what majority is needed in that instance, as well as
what popular majority is required to change the constitution (excluded from table). These variables
give insight to the ease of changing the constitution entirely in order to bypass a state court
decision. While never a simple process, it is easier to attain a two-thirds majority to call for an
amendment, followed by a simple majority vote between both houses for ratification and a majority
vote of the people (as is the case in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974) than it is when an initial
two-thirds majority is required to call for an amendment, followed by a ratification process of
another two-thirds vote of the present legislature, two-thirds vote by the next legislature, in
addition to a majority of the people. Recent events in Poland and Hungary demonstrate that
Constitutions that are easy to alter can produce situations in which political actors engage in
repeated constitutional change to circumvent judicial review of legislation (Agence FrancePreesse, 2015; Scheppele, 2015).
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Appointment methods of high court judges are considered strong indicators of the
independence of judges (Landes and Posner, 1975; Melton and Ginsberg, 2014). The appointment
method of state court judges, especially through the lens of election procedures, is the most
commonly studied factor in state court research for evaluating judicial independence to date.
However, given its importance, it was again studied in this paper, and it is introduced in the next
grouping of variables (Table 4).
The first variable within the group simply reflects what the constitution specifies as the
appointment method for judges to the highest state court (Table 4). This yields three different
categories: none (if left up to legislative statute or amendments), appointment, or election. If judges
are elected, it is coded as one of five different categories: none, type unspecified, legislative,
partisan, or nonpartisan. If judges are instead appointed to the high court, the factor is broken down
into nomination and appointment procedures. In all constitutions, nominations are made by a
commission, the governor, or are not specified within the constitution, while appointments are
made by the governor, the governor with the Senate, the legislature as a whole, a commission, or
are not specified.3
Group 3: Appointment Methods
What is the method of appointment for judges to
the high court (Feld and Voigt 2003; Skaar 2002)?
Elections

Nominations

Appointment
Election
Not Specified
Legislature
Partisan
Non-Partisan
Type Unspecified
None
Commission
Governor
Type Unspecified
None

3

The sole exception to these categories comes from the 1776 Constitution of Delaware, in which three Supreme
Court justices are appointed by a legislative council and the other three justices are appointed by the House of
the Assembly. This is the only instance in which different groups nominate and appoint a certain specified
proportion of judges to the high courts.
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Appointments

Legislature
Governor
Governor with Senate
Commission
Other
Type Unspecified
None

The next subgroup of variables follows almost identically to the previous one, but it instead
evaluates retention methods (Table 5). The first variable within the group shows what the
constitution specifies as the method for judicial retention on the highest state court. All methods
fall into essentially the same three categories as initial appointment method: none (in the case of
statutes, amendments, or life terms with good behavior), reappointment, or election. The type of
election is coded as either none, type unspecified, retention, legislature, partisan, or non-partisan,
and the type of reappointment is coded as none, type unspecified, commission, legislature,
governor with Senate, or governor. There are very few cases in which the type of appointment
method differs from the type of retention method.4
Group 4: Retention Methods
What is the method of retention for judges on the
high court (Nardulli, 2012)?

Elections

Appointments

Appointment
Election
Type Unspecified
None
Legislature
Partisan
Non-Partisan
Type Unspecified
None
Legislature
Governor
Governor with Senate
Type Unspecified
None

4

These are the instances in which a judge is appointed initially and then subject to a retention election after their
first term or elected by the people initially and then subject to a legislative vote to stay in office after their first
term.
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The subject of the fifth grouping of variables is judicial tenure (Table 6). The first of these
variables is simply whether or not the constitution specifies the tenure of judges. If specified, which
is the case for all but two constitutions (left up to statute in the Michigan Constitution of 1908 and
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1776), the length of initial and subsequent terms is recorded
next. This spans from a term of one year in Georgia’s 1777 Constitution to life terms with good
behavior. Only three current state constitutions have provisions for life terms for high court judges
(Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Rhode Island
Constitution of 1986), but Massachusetts and New Hampshire have since passed laws for
mandatory retirement at a certain age.5 The final variable within this category answers the question
of how the length of tenure for judges compares to the terms of members of other political branches
of government (Rios-Figueroa, 2011). The only constitutions in which judicial tenure does not
exceed that of other political actors are the first two constitutions of Georgia, dated 1777 and 1789,
and this was only changed with the ratification of a new constitution in 1865.6
Group 5: Judicial Tenure (Feld and Voigt, 2003; La Porta et. al., 2004; Smithey and Ishiyama,
2000; Skaar, 2002)
Does the constitution specify tenure for judges?
Yes
No
Length of tenure
Misc.
Tenure longer than other officials?
Longer
Longer than House & Governor
Same length as others

Removal procedures are the topic of the sixth group of variables (Table 7). Of the
constitutions studied, 98% explicitly state procedures to remove justices from the high court bench.

5

Massachusetts passed a law in 1975 declaring a mandatory retirement age of 70 for judges (Massachusetts
General Laws Part I, Title IV, Chapter 32, Section 65D). By 1792, New Hampshire added Article 78 to their
constitution, limiting judges from serving beyond the age of 70. Justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court are
the only judges in the US states that have life terms and are not subject to a mandatory retirement age.
6
In the Georgia Constitution of 1777, the term lengths for high court judges, Senators, members of the House,
and the Governor were all equal at one year. By 1789, the state had changed the term of judges and Senators to
three years, which was longer than the one-year term for House members and the Governor’s two-year term.
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These removal procedures come in the form of impeachment, address of the governor with a vote
of the legislature, judiciary-appointed commissions on judicial conduct, or disciplinary action by
the Supreme Court itself. Some states have made all of these methods available to remove high
court judges (Wisconsin Constitution of 1848), while other states, like West Virginia, only lay out
one method for judicial removal.7 There are varying levels of difficulty to remove justices, from
impeachment requiring a simple majority vote in both houses without the participation of any other
political actors (Indiana Constitution of 1816, West Virginia Constitution of 1863) to a two-thirds
vote of each house of the general assembly following an address by the governor (South Carolina
Constitution of 1868). Additionally, in some states, removal of high court justices can come from
the people in the form of a recall election.
Group 6: Removal Procedures
Are the removal procedures for judges specified in
the constitution (Feld and Voigt, 2003; Keith,
2002; Smithey and Ishiyama, 2000)?
Can the state legislature remove judges from
office?

Can the governor remove judges from office?

Can the judiciary remove judges from office?

Can the public remove judges from office?

Yes
No
Majority one house, supermajority other
Supermajority both
Majority both
Not Specified
No
Yes
Shared with legislature
Not Specified
No
Judiciary-appointed commission
Supreme Court
No
Recall
No

The next few variables do not fall into a particular group, but are important nonetheless.
First is a variable denoting whether or not the constitution states that judges are protected from
salary reduction (Table 8). This protection is important as it prevents high court judges from

7

In West Virginia (Constitution of 1872), judges can only be impeached in order to be removed. This requires
a simple majority vote by the house, followed by a two-thirds vote of the senate.
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fearing retribution for unpopular or contentious decisions in the form salary reduction.8 In 76% of
constitutions and amendments studied, judges are protected from salary reduction. This protection
typically comes in the form of the constitution stating that salary is left up to legislative statute,
but that it cannot be reduced during the judges’ tenure. However, in five constitutions, the salary
of high court judges is explicitly stated in the constitution. The financial independence of the
judiciary was evaluated as well. If the judiciary had control over its own budget, this variable was
coded as “yes,” but if it was not stated or if the judicial budget is set by the legislature, it was given
a “not specified” or “budget set by legislature,” respectively. In the majority of constitutions and
amendments, the judicial budget is left up to statute to be decided by the legislature in their annual
setting of the budget with no explicitly stated requirement of input from the judiciary. The Chief
Justice and the judiciary have the power to set their own budget in only three state constitutions
throughout history (Michigan Constitution of 1963, Nebraska Constitution of 1875, South Dakota
Constitution of 1889).
Group 7: Salary and Finances
Do state supreme court judges have salary
protection (Feld and Voigt, 2003; Nardulli, 2012)?

Is the judiciary financially independent (Skaar,
2002)?

Salary set by constitution
Yes
Not Specified
No
Yes
Not Specified
Budget set by legislature

The variables evaluating a requirement for publication of decisions as well as formalized
judicial review yielded interesting results that will be excluded from analysis for the remainder of
the paper following a brief discussion here. Thirty-three constitutions explicitly state that judicial
decisions must be publicized. However, the time periods in which publication of decisions were
required in constitutions seems random. In several state constitutions, like the Maryland

8

See Chavez, 2003; Posner and Yoo, 2005; Resnik, 1999
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Constitution of 1851, one of the intermediary documents requires publication of judicial decisions,
but the constitutions before and after it do not. Judicial review is only formalized in 34
constitutions (23.4%), and it retains concrete review powers in 33 of those instances. None of the
subsequent amendments to these constitutions changed this. In two constitutions, the high court
retains formalized abstract review power as the legislature can go to the court to ask if a proposed
legislative act would be deemed constitutional. In the Michigan Constitution of 1963, this abstract
review power is seen in combination with concrete review power, but abstract judicial review is
seen alone in the New York Constitution of 1777, easily explained by the fact that it was drafted
and ratified before Marbury v. Madison (1803). Concrete judicial review had yet to be established,
and thus it is obvious it would be left out of that early constitution.
For the purposes of this paper, judicial review will be left out of analysis. Court scholars
have often focused on the type of judicial review: abstract, concrete, or amparo (Ginsburg, 2003;
Stone Sweet, 2000). In the context of state supreme courts, constitutions rarely explicitly state that
courts have judicial review power. This is unsurprising considering the power also does not appear
in the federal constitution or any of its subsequent amendments. Since there is a lack of variation
in states’ failure to include judicial review in constitutions, this factor can be excluded from
analysis. It can be dismissed as explaining variations and levels of judicial independence in US
states because it simply does not change.9
Group 8: Miscellaneous
Is judicial review power included in the
constitution (Feld and Voigt, 2003; Skaar, 2002)?
Are court decisions required to be published (Feld
and Voigt, 2003)?

Yes
No
Yes
No

9

For the same reason, I have chosen to exclude the factor measuring constitutional bans on military courts as
well. Keith (2002) mentioned this as a factor may be relevant to an overall measure of judicial independence.
However, in the data collected for this project, there was no variation in the factor, as none of the states have a
constitutional ban on military courts.
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I grouped the final four factors together for purposes of presenting them here. The first two
factors assess which actor is given the power to set court procedures (Table 10). In some cases,
the court is constitutionally permitted to set its own procedures. In others, the legislature is given
the power to decide how the courts will operate. An entirely independent court should be able to
set its own procedures with no legislative oversight or the approval of any other political body
(Morgan, 1918; Shanfeld, 1934).10 The last two factors collected are the presence of ballot
initiatives and referenda. These are the two factors least associated with the state judiciary directly,
but both provide the people the power to potentially alter constitutional provisions affecting state
courts, so they were included in data collection.
Group 10: Court Procedures
Does the judiciary have the authority to set their
own procedures (Smithey and Ishiyama, 2000;
Keith, 2002)?
Does the legislature have the authority to set
court procedures?

Group 11: Ballot Initiatives and Referenda
Does the constitution specify procedures for
ballot initiatives?

Does the constitution specify procedures for
referenda?

Exclusive Authority
Shared Authority
No Authority
Not Specified
Exclusive Authority
Shared Authority
No Authority
Not Specified
Constitutional and Statutory
Constitutional
Statutory
None
Constitutional and Statutory
Constitutional
Statutory
None

RESULTS

Before discussing overall trends in state constitutions, it is important to provide a description of
de jure constitutional provisions for judicial independence during each of the three designated time
periods. In this section, I will again focus on new constitutions and amendments to existing
10

Justice Steven Breyer called the ability of a court to set its own procedures “the power that is nearest the core
of institutional judicial independence” (Breyer, 1996).
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constitutions that brought a change to factors measuring judicial independence. More importantly,
I will closely evaluate the overall trends for these changes in each of the three period instead of
discussing all 42 factors. I will also highlight notable exceptions to these trends as necessary.
As noted, the vast majority of change in constitutional provisions regarding state courts
comes from new constitutions, not from amendments. Throughout this paper, this will be
highlighted as a general trend, but I will indicate the exceptions to the trend as well. For instance,
the only two factors for which amendments seemed to bring about a higher proportion of change
than new constitutions did are ballot initiatives and referenda. However, of the factors collected,
ballot initiatives and referenda are the factors furthest removed from the courts. This highlights
how unimportant the amendments themselves are in the context of state supreme courts and the
subsequent analysis of them.
PRE-CIVIL WAR

Before 1860, the majority of selection and retention methods for state supreme court justices
changed from appointment to election. Eight of the nine states that changed selection methods
during the period switched from appointment to election, and 11 of the 13 states altering judicial
retention methods also switched from appointment to election. These changes were often
simultaneous, frequently occurring alongside significant decreases in the tenure of high court
justices as well. A notable trend stems from this as states moved from life term appointments to a
specified term length ranging from six to 15 years. The trends in these three variables are especially
important as it is frequently accepted in court scholarship that appointed judges are more
independent from political processes than those who can be held accountable for potentially
unpopular decisions through elections, and judges who enjoy life terms once in office are more
likely to make independent decisions without fear of being removed from office at the expiration
of their term instead of being re-elected (Boies, 2006).
21

In the pre-Civil War period, none of the states allowed high courts to set their own
operating procedures, instead opting to give the state legislature that power. This also exemplifies
the trend of reduced judicial independence in the period, as courts that are given the opportunity
to set procedure, or at least those granted shared authority to do so, are considered more
independent than those relying on the state legislature to develop procedures. Constitutional
provisions also allowed court budgets to be determined by the state legislature in all states at this
time. However, this is true in nearly all states over the course of history, not just in this period.
RECONSTRUCTION

Overall, more trends in de jure provisions for judicial independence are evident in Reconstruction
than the pre-Civil War period. Reconstruction (and the Progressive Era) brought a greater number
of changes to appointment and retention methods (34 changes versus 25 in the pre-Civil War
period). All of the states that made changes to appointment and retention methods provided for
election of their high court justices by 1913. Whereas these changes in the previous time period
were accompanied by decreases in judicial tenure, tenure length stayed consistently short (between
six to 14 years) for states ratifying new constitutions and passing amendments affecting tenure
length during this period. Maryland, however, extended judicial terms to life with their constitution
of 1864, but a mere three years later with the ratification of a new constitution, it was reduced back
down to 10 years.
All ten of the constitutions that altered judicial provisions affecting court procedures in the
Reconstruction period granted the court exclusive power to set their own operating procedures.
Nine of the states had previously granted the court no power to do this through the ratification of
new constitutions, while the Supreme Court in the tenth state, Arkansas, shared authority with the
state legislature to set procedures until the 1876 amendment to the constitution. This is consistent
with my findings from an earlier version of this paper showing a trend toward granting the court
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exclusive power to set their own procedures after the Civil War (illustrated with the accompanying
graph):

No Authority

Authority

State High Court Ability to Set Own Procedures Over Time

1800

1850

1900

1950

Year

Figure 5. This graph creates a visualization over time of the power given in state constitutions for the high
court to set their own procedures. The variables coded as shared authority and exclusive authority in initial
data collection were collapsed into one variable here, “authority,” in order to more effectively demonstrate
the shift from not affording the high court any power to make decisions regarding procedure to giving the
court that authority.

This graph shows a distinct transition from state constitutions explicitly giving the
legislature exclusive power to set court procedure to giving the judiciary either
exclusive or shared power to set procedure...this shift occurred after the Civil War,
during the Reconstruction era...as a period of rapid constitutional change began...
This is important as it shows the overall trend towards more judicial relevance in
politics seen in the United States, as well as other countries throughout the world
(Hirschl, 2008). (Pilatovsky, 2016)
More specifically, this trend began with Maryland’s move to exclusive authority for the court to
set their procedures in 1867, and it ended (at least for this period) with Michigan’s shift in 1908.
Thus, in the comparatively short span of 40 years, ten states followed the trend.
There are notable trends during this period for two more of the factors: the judiciary as an
independent branch of government and ballot initiatives. States moved towards the inclusion of
constitutional provisions explicitly stating the judiciary is an independent branch of government
in the Reconstruction period. By the end of the period, five more states said that the judiciary is an
independent branch of government along with the legislative and executive branch. This is
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significant because no changes were seen for this factor in the most recent period of time (Present
Day), so all states that had previously failed to explicitly state that the judiciary was independent
did so by the end of the Reconstruction period. Additionally, an increasing number of states moved
to provide for statutory and constitutional ballot initiatives from previously not allowing any at all.
Two-thirds of changes to constitutional provisions for ballot initiatives were made through passing
amendments as opposed to the ratification of an entirely new constitution. This comes in contrast
to the overall trend that most changes to the factors collected occurred through the ratification of
new constitutions.
While more trends in constitutional provisions are apparent in this time period,
Reconstruction did not bring widespread change in de jure constitutional provisions that may
theoretically decrease judicial independence like the pre-Civil War period did. It is true that a
greater number of states moved toward electing high court judges during Reconstruction, but this
trend was noted before 1960, so this period did not greatly impact decreasing judicial independence
in the states. Reconstruction introduced a greater number of de jure constitutional provisions to
increase judicial independence for state courts compared to the previous period as a large number
of states moved to allow the court to exclusively set their own operating procedures (Keith, 2002;
Smithey and Ishiyama, 2000) and a several more states explicitly declared their courts independent
of other branches of government (Keith, 2002).
PRESENT DAY

Once again, the most notable trends in the Present Day period stem from changes to constitutional
provisions for appointment and retention methods and court procedures. Constitutions and
amendments passed during this time period show the reverse of the trend from pre-Civil War and
Reconstruction in that the appointment and retention methods changed from election to
appointment. However, this trend is expected as the Missouri Plan was developed in 1940 and
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states began to adopt the system. The Missouri Plan provided for judicial appointments by an
independent selection committee. However, this shift back to appointments from elections did not
bring an increase in judicial tenure for high state court justices as the reverse trend brought a sharp
decrease in tenure length. Justices retained essentially the same tenure lengths as in the previous
periods with most states setting term length at 10 years.
Since 1914, fifteen states have changed constitutional provisions that determine who has
the authority to set state high court procedure. Through 2015, twelve of these states gave exclusive
power to the court to set their own procedure, while the remaining three states moved from a
system in which the legislature had exclusive authority to set court procedure to shared authority
between the court and the state legislature. This is even more change for this factor than what was
seen in the previous time period. It is indicative of increased de jure provisions for judicial
independence as it gives the court some power to set their own procedures instead of delegating
that power to the state legislature (Keith, 2002). New York provides one interesting case of a state
taking power away from the court through the ratification of a constitution. It moved in the
opposite direction as the states following this trend as it changed from providing the court
exclusive authority in setting procedure to only allowing the court shared authority to do so with
the help of the state legislature.
I will refrain from discussing ballot initiatives and referenda in great detail because these
are the factors that are least applicable to the state judiciary specifically. However, this period
follows the same trend as the Reconstruction period in regards to ballot initiatives and referenda:
an overall increase in the number of states including constitutional provisions for these procedures.
Among the states that have added these provisions to their constitutions, ballot initiatives are most
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commonly allowed for statutory and constitutional measures, while referenda are frequently
reserved for statutes only.
In sum, states have taken strides toward increased de jure judicial independence through
changes to constitutional provisions since 1914. To do this, lawmakers have focused primarily on
changing appointment method, retention method, and the courts’ ability to set procedure. Many
states have switched their appointment and retention methods from electing high court justices to
appointing them by following the Missouri Plan. A great number of states have also increased de
jure judicial independence by affording the high court the power to set their own operating
procedures, a trend beginning in the Reconstruction period but greatly expanded upon since.
OVERALL ANALYSIS

Most changes to constitutional provisions for US state courts overall have occurred through the
ratification of entirely new constitutions. Few changes affecting the 42 factors studied here
stemmed from the passage of amendments. There are, however, a few factors that were changed
with amendments at a higher rate than others, most notably ballot initiatives, referenda, and tenure
length. Tenure length was one of the most frequently changed constitutional provisions affecting
high state courts, so it is unsurprising that the changes occurred both through ratification of new
constitutions and amendments. All the drastic changes to term length, like changes from life terms
for high court judges to a term 15 years or less, occurred through new constitutions, while
incremental changes occasionally took place through the passage of an amendment.
A greater number of changes stemming from amendments occurred in the Present Day
period than in the earlier pre-Civil War and Reconstruction periods. The inclusion of both ballot
initiatives and referenda are the primary reason this is true. Many states have moved toward
offering citizens these powers in recent decades, and most have done so through enacting
amendments. Since ballot initiatives and referenda are the two factors that least affect judicial
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independence, it is more telling to evaluate the percentage of changes to the judiciary occurring
through amendments. Without those factors, 84% of changes in constitutional provisions for state
judiciaries occur through the ratification of new constitutions. Thus, it is clear the claim that
amendments are less important than new constitutions in evaluating de jure provisions for judicial
independence is valid.
From 1776–2015, few isolated constitutional changes affecting courts occurred. Isolated
constitutional changes, in this context, are defined as new constitutions or amendments that only
altered one of the 42 factors that this data collected for. There are 235 total changes to
constitutional provisions affecting courts within the data set: 53 occurred in the pre-Civil War
period, 104 occurred during Reconstruction, and 78 occurred Present Day. Of those changes, only
44, or 18.72%, were isolated.
The number of isolated changes occurring in the Present Day period (23) is more than the
number of isolated changes in the other two combined (12 and 9, respectively, for a total of 21).
Only 7 of the amendments affecting state high courts in the Present Day period were not isolated,
thus affecting two or more of the collected factors simultaneously. This is especially interesting as
more changes in this period occurred via amendments, versus entirely new constitutions, as well.
Of the 23 isolated changes in the Present Day period, 12 (or 52%) resulted from the passage of
amendments. This is compared to 16.6% for the pre-Civil War period and 33% for the
Reconstruction period. For both the pre-Civil War and Reconstruction periods, the greatest number
of isolated changes affected the length of tenure for high court judges, while in the Present Day
period, court procedures were the most frequently affected factor, followed closely by tenure
length.
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Given the trend of court scholarship focusing on appointment procedures for high court
judges, one question stuck out when evaluating isolated change: have changes regarding
appointment procedures occurred at the same time as other changes made to constitutional
provisions for courts or are they happening independently of other changes? Overwhelmingly, the
data shows that changes in appointment procedures bring about changes in other collected factors.
Only 6 constitutions and amendments only affected appointment procedures independent of all
other change. This is a mere 15% of constitutional provisions affecting appointment procedures.
Retention method and tenure length are the factors most commonly associated with a change in
appointment procedures, with at least one, or both, occurring in 76% of changes to constitutional
provisions affecting appointment procedures.
Some may argue that since changes in appointment methods are highly correlated with
changes in retention methods, the calculations above should be refigured with the constitutions
and amendments that only changed those two factors in isolation versus the constitutional changes
that affected more than appointment and retention method. Thus, to get a more accurate measure
of the independence of changing court procedures, it may be important to exclude the
constitutional provisions that only affected retention method in addition to appointment
procedures. This argument can be made because retention methods are typically closely tied to
appointment methods – if the judges are appointed to their positions, they are usually re-appointed
upon the expiration of their term. However, the results are still significant if this argument is
followed. Two-thirds of constitutions and amendments affect additional factors alongside
appointment and retention method, bringing much more wholesale institutional change to state
courts at one time.
As shown, even if it is the case that we exclude constitutions and amendments that
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simultaneously bring changes to appointment and retention methods, we still miss 2/3 of the
changes that affect the judiciary. Clearly, this data is evidence that in an overwhelming majority
of changes, those writing the laws think other factors also matter. State court scholars often focus
attention on the effect of appointment method on judicial independence exclusively. Since those
writing the rules do not think appointment methods can be focused on without also turning
attention to other factors, there is no reason for scholars to evaluate judicial appointment methods
while ignoring other factors of explanatory value. Institutional packages are clearly important to
those creating laws, so it is imperative for scholars to explore the changes to other factors alongside
appointment methods to draw accurate conclusions about judicial independence.
In the context of constitutional changes to state high courts, it does not appear that states serve
as laboratories of democracy.11 Several of the major trends observed in this data set indicate this,
as large groups of states made the same changes to constitutional provisions affecting courts at
roughly the same time. The first instance of this comes in the pre-Civil War period as states moved
to shorter term lengths for high court judges. Before this, the majority of judges enjoyed life terms.
However, by the beginning of the Civil War, the 11 states that made changes to the tenure of high
court judges during this period had decreased the term length from life to between 6-15 years. This
is especially significant because during the same period, seven of the eight states that altered
appointment method of high court judges moved from a method of appointment to election.
Through pre-existing research on term lengths and appointment procedures, it has been established
that short term lengths in combination with subjecting judges to initial and retention elections

11

The concept of states as laboratories of democracy is a phrase famously popularized by former
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. It refers to the idea that states can “serve as a
laboratory” by experimenting with and testing policies without posing a threat or risk to other
states.
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makes for a much less independent judiciary as judges often feel that they Only 7 of the
amendments affecting state high courts in this same span of time were not isolated, affecting more
than one of the collected factors simultaneously. must make decisions to please those that hold
their fate in their votes.
The next example of a trend that undermines the theory of states as laboratories of
democracy is the move toward ballot initiatives and referenda in constitutional provisions. In the
Reconstruction period, nine states incorporated the power to call for ballot initiatives for both
statutes and constitutional provisions, and eight states (six of the same states who granted ballot
initiatives) included the power for referenda. Most of the states, 62.5%, extended referenda power
to statutes only, while the others did so for both statutes and constitutional provisions.
Additionally, 66% of states who added ballot initiatives during this time period did so through the
passage of amendments instead of passing new constitutions with this power added. The same
states who passed ballot initiatives through amendments included referenda power within the same
amendment. Similarly, during the Present Day period, five additional states incorporated ballot
initiatives and six states incorporated referenda. Of these, 70% occurred through the ratification of
new constitutions, which comes in contrast to the majority of these powers that were incorporated
through amendments in the preceding period.
Finally, the last instance of changes of constitutional provisions affecting courts forming a
trend that appears to undermine the theory of states as laboratories of democracy is the increasing
number of these provisions that allow the court to set its own procedure. Throughout the pre-Civil
War period, no states granted their high courts the power to set their own procedures, instead
leaving this power to the state legislature. As discussed, in the Reconstruction period, ten states
included constitutional provisions in new constitutions or passed amendments that explicitly
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granted state high courts to set their own procedures. This trend is important because it shows that
after the Civil War, US states shifted to affording the state high courts more judicial independence
overall.
BARRIERS TO INDICES

Ultimately, I wanted to develop a measure of judicial independence to compare all state
constitutions over time, and I recognize that some scholars would prefer a single score applied to
this research that would represent judicial independence. However, I have come to the realization
that this will ultimately not be appropriate for this data. There are several reasons why a single
score may not capture what is, in essence, a multi-dimensional phenomenon.
I originally thought it would be important to first aggregate the data due to the large
number of factors in the data set. The Polity IV codebook (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013) is
held as one of the best examples of the utilization of an aggregate index like the one that could
potentially be developed for this data set. However, the Polity IV codebook has statistical and
conceptual problems that would be unavoidably introduced if the method was applied to this data
as well. If I were to follow this method, I would collapse the broken down factors back into broader
groups within each sub-group so that there are as few responses for each variable as possible.
Ideally, there would be no more than 3-4 response values per factor. Then I would need to develop
a Thurstone scale within each independent variable. In Thurstone scaling, each response is ordered
from least favorable to the concept (a score of 1) to most favorable to the concept (a score of nresponses minus 1). Thus, in my analysis, the responses within each factor would be assigned a
value from 0 = least indicative of judicial independence to (n-1) = most indicative of judicial
independence. This ranking would be based on what previous scholars have found in their studies
of judicial independence. For instance, for the court’s ability to set their own procedures, a value
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of 1 would be applied to “no authority” [identified by Smithey and Ishiyama, 2000; Keith, 2002
as low judicial independence], a value of 2 would be applied to “shared authority,” and a value of
3 would be applied to “exclusive authority” (most representative of high judicial independence).
Then, by adding up the scores for all of the factors by constitution, a measure of judicial
independence for each constitution would be generated. In this context, the constitutions with the
highest raw scores would be indicative of the greatest judicial independence.
However, as mentioned, there are significant problems with this approach. The greatest
problem with this measure is that if one factor has an exceptionally large number of responses, and
a constitution receives the highest score possible for that one factor, it has the potential to greatly
increase the overall score for judicial independence for that constitution, even if it is not truly the
constitution with the most judicial independence. In other words, one individual factor can drive
all of the results (in this case, the total score for judicial independence). When a mid-range score
appears, it would carry no explanatory value as it is impossible to decode what that score actually
means. Pointedly, we do not know, from an empirical standpoint, what these factors do to the
judiciary. Even if the data were somehow normalized by normalized value = raw value/maximum
raw value to generate scores between 0 and 1, the same problems would exist.
The best way to get around this problem would be to collapse all of the factors into binary
variables from the beginning, assigning a value of 1 to the response more indicative of judicial
independence and 0 to the response showing no judicial independence. This way, there would be
a maximum possible score of 42 for the constitution with the highest level of de jure judicial
independence and a minimum score of 0 for no judicial independence at all. However, while this
would work for some of the factors (for instance, collapsing the court’s ability to set their own
procedures into “no authority” and “some authority”), it is virtually impossible to collapse all of
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the variables down that far (i.e. the type of elections category – currently it is “none,” “nonpartisan,” “partisan,” “legislative,” “unspecified”). That said, this method of measuring de jure
judicial independence for this project would not work either.
Thus, after further evaluation, it does not seem like developing an empirical measure of
judicial independence for this data will be possible. However, doing so is not necessary to properly
evaluate the data. This data set provides great explanatory value without developing such a
measure. There is simply no reason to introduce needless error into the research by forcing the
data to fit a statistical method it is not well-suited for.
CONCLUSION

As my dataset deals exclusively with de jure judicial independence, it would be useful and
wonderful to have a pre-developed measure of de facto judicial independence in each state over
time to compare it to, in order to see how much of a predictor of de facto judicial independence
the de jure provisions are. However, this is a seemingly impossible task for this data set for many
reasons, both statistically and conceptually.
Despite this problem, there are many unique and useful applications for this data. In one
application, the data could be used to explain differences in judicial behavior due to institutional
design and constraints. De jure provisions for institutions have a major effect on the individual
actors operating under those institutions. Take, for example, the differences between the United
States House and Senate. Both levels of the bicameral structure make up the federal legislative
body, but they have a fundamentally different institutional design that heavily differentiate one
from the another. They are each comprised of individual members elected to the national
legislature. Applying theories of individual behavior to this situation would lead one to conclude
that both bodies of the federal legislature should behave similarly because they are comprised of
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individual members, but time and time again, it is observed that the behavior of the institutions
themselves are completely different. Therefore, these observations cannot be accounted for by
evaluation at an institutional level. The only explanation for these variations in behavior are the
multitude of institutional design differences between the two bodies. For instance, according to
the Constitution, Senators are elected for six-year terms while members of the House are elected
for two-year terms, which leads to a much higher turnover rate and less lifetime politicians in the
House than the Senate. Senators are elected from a state-wide jurisdiction while members of the
House are elected from much smaller districts. Additionally, the Senate is governed by much laxer
rules with features like open debate and the ability to filibuster, where a minority of members can
block legislation in its entirety. The House, on the other hand, follows much stricter rules of
procedure, follows a tighter timeline, and members lack the ability to filibuster a bill. Due to these
de jure differences between the US House and Senate, a variety of de facto behavioral differences
are obvious. Seeing that de jure provisions for institutional design have a large impact on the
observed behaviors of the United States legislature, researchers have since applied the theory to
comparative international institutions as well, notably in the study of comparative judicial politics
(Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Melton and Ginsburg, 2014). Further, we should expect to see the same
effect on state courts.
Additionally, the data could be used to trace the trends in judicial independence versus the
factors collected under various political conditions and shifts. Levels of judicial independence
afforded to state high courts fluctuate over time due to the de jure constitutional provisions studied
here. Studies similar in nature to this have been applied to Argentina, tracing the strength of judicial
independence under Argentina’s unstable government throughout much of the twentieth century
(Chavez, 2003; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi, 2002). Additionally, the effects of changing
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political conditions and the ongoing construction of the rule of law on judicial independence have
been noted in other countries, including Mexico (Rios-Figueroa, 2007). While US state
governments are not necessarily unstable, 60% of them have experienced more constitutional
change since their statehood than the US federal government has seen in almost 230 years. When
taken into consideration alongside amendments that alter portions of state constitutions relating to
factors collected here, the changes made are sufficient to evaluate effects on judicial independence.
Further, constitutional provisions and subsequent amendments are byproducts of the political
conditions at the time of their adoption. Thus, political conditions have been shown to have a large
effect on judicial bodies. For example, more powerful judges are typically found under conditions
of greater political competition, while weaker judges usually stem from one-party states (Ginsburg,
2003; Ramseyer, 1994). This is due to the fact that when there is little political competition,
political actors do not have a reason to respect the authority of the judiciary when it makes
decisions counter to their political agenda. Given the research on comparative courts, similar
effects of political conditions on judicial independence should be seen in US state courts.
Integrating comparative court research into the study of state courts, I have collected data
evaluating over three dozen factors – from appointments to tenure to removal procedures and more
– on 145 state constitutions throughout the history of US states. This paper serves as a step towards
a deeper understanding of de jure constitutional provisions for judicial independence at the state
level. Here, I have given descriptive statistics about the data set in order to further understand it in
future applications. Additionally, I have identified trends within state constitutions and subsequent
amendments over time for factors affecting de facto judicial independence. These trends show an
increase in de jure provisions in state constitutions that strengthen and increase judicial
independence. The data collected for this research has opened avenues for state court research that
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can take it far beyond the effects of election procedures on judicial behavior and its utility in this
paper alone.
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